Korean War Armistice Signing Anniversary

Truce In Korea 1953

This past July 27^th marked the 59^th anniversary of the signing of the armistice that officially put the Korean War on hold. It was a silent holiday that went nearly unnoticed by the world. However, for those soldiers who lived through the Korean War, this was an important day, no matter what side they fought on, and many gathered to remember and to celebrate.

In North Korea, this day was celebrated with war veterans visiting Panmunjom to pledge their unchanging loyalty to North Korea’s young leader, Kim Jong Un. Fireworks were also fired to celebrate the day. The commemorations are meant to kindle patriotism and loyalty in North Koreans, and especially the young, by showcasing veterans who fought for their country, said Kim Yeon-su of Korea National Defense University in Seoul. Ahead of the anniversary, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry reiterated its long-standing demand that the United States sign a peace treaty with North Korea to replace the armistice. However, the United States continues to stand by its claim that normal ties will only come after North Korea abandons its pursuit of nuclear weapons and takes other steps towards change.

Will the recent North Korea’s nuclear test affect Park’s Engagement Policy?

Park Geun-hye, the first female president of South Korea, faces an additional enormous struggle at a start of her presidency by the North Korea’s detonation of an underground nuclear device that took place on February 12, 2013.

 

During the presidency campaign, Park introduced a very determined engagement policy with North Korea that was meant to lessen the tension that has been growing between the two Koreas for last five years. It is now questionable whether she would turn to the old Lee Myung Bak’s approach of the tough and rigid policy her fellow conservative predecessor chose to implement. Her decision will play an extremely critical role in influencing the diplomatic relations of U.S., China and Japan with North Korea and the methods they will take to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear weapon ambitions.

 

Again, it is clear that the division and the tension on the Korea Peninsula is not merely a domestic, but an international issue which will affect both the superpowers and the non-superpowers. Victor Cha, Director of the Asian Studies program in Georgetown, stated that “The overall policy direction on North Korea among the U.S., Japan and South Korea will be [Park Geun-hye] to decide”.

 

This nuclear test clearly signifies a violation to the council resolutions and is a threat to international peace. The South Korean Foreign Minister, Kim Sung Hwan says the council will work “on appropriate measures in a Security Council resolution” and promised “significant action,” if another nuclear test takes place. The U.N. Security Council, along with the world leaders across the globe, severely condemned this nuclear test. Korean Central News Agency stated that the purpose of the test was “to defend the country’s security and sovereignty in the face of the ferocious hostile act of the U.S.” and “if the U.S. continues with their hostility and complicates the situation, it would be inevitable to continuously conduct a stronger second or third measure.” So, some analysts have said that this provocative act signifies a foreign policy challenge for the U.S. president, Barack Obama.

 

During Park’s inauguration speech, she took a firm stand by saying “North Korea’s recent nuclear test is a challenge to the survival and future of the Korean people and there should be no mistake that the biggest victim will be none other than North Korea itself…I will not tolerate any action that threatens the lives of our people and the security of our nation.”

 

However, Park says she won’t change her policy despite the concerns and doubts about the plausibility of her engagement policy. Park acknowledges the South Koreans have been unhappy and frustrated with the current state between the two Koreas under Lee Myung Bak’s rule as they saw two nuclear tests, three long-range rocket launches and the sinking of the South Korean navy that killed nearly 50 South Koreans in 2010. She urged North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions for peace and mutual development. Furthermore, she emphasized that “trust can be built through dialogue and honoring promises, which will allow the trust-building process on the Korean peninsula”.

Secretary of State John Kerry Could Change U.S.-North Korea Relations

In January, John Kerry replaced Hilary Clinton as United States Secretary of State. Secretary Kerry, who has called for more engagement with Pyongyang in the past, could usher in a new American strategy towards North Korea.

            In a 2011 commentary for the Los Angeles Times, Secretary Kerry advocated a policy of direct engagement. He called for a return to the six-party talks. He also proposed resuming recovery operations in North Korea for American military personnel still missing from the Korean War, as a means of communicating directly with Pyongyang. This would have the dual purpose of opening communications with North Korea, as well as ensuring that no American is left behind. Secretary Kerry has also criticized the Obama administration’s policy of “strategic patience,” in which U.S. dialogue with North Korea is conditional upon North Korea’s denuclearization. He argues that the administration’s current approach of harsh sanctions and ignoring North Korea is inadequate, and will not change its behavior.

However, there is also the possibility that Secretary Kerry will maintain the status quo of U.S.-North Korea relations. His attention may be occupied by security threats in the Middle East, which would move North Korea down on the U.S.’s list of diplomatic priorities. Furthermore, Secretary Kerry will have to work with President Obama, National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, Republicans in Congress, and other hardliners against North Korea, who would impede his more liberal vision. Political climate at the moment—so soon after the North’s recent missile launch—calls for sanctions against North Korea, not direct dialogue. Lastly, there is a very real possibility that Secretary Kerry will grow tired of North Korea’s intransigence and violations of international law, and adopt a more conservative policy down the road. When President Obama first entered office in 2009, he advocated resuming the six-party talks and directly engaging with the North. But after repeated breaches of international agreements and numerous missile launches, President Obama abandoned this agenda for his “strategic patience” doctrine.

 

제1차 숭실 교류 협력 포럼 개성공단 어디로 가나? – 제재 이후 개성공단의 미래

안녕하세요? 제1차 숭실 교류 협력 포럼이 열린다는 소식을 듣고, 숭실대학교를 찾아가 보았습니다. 2월 13일 수요일 조민식 기념관에서 여러 전문가들이 개성공단의 현황과 미래에 관해서 토론을 나누는 좋은 시간을 가졌습니다. 남북협력지구의 서호 단장님과 경남대학교 북한대학원 교수이시며 전 통일부 차관을 역임하신 이관세 교수님의 발표가 있었습니다.

 

<개성공단의 사업적 성격>

개성공단의 본질은 남한의 자본과 기술에 북한의 노동력과 토지를 더하여 상생을 이루기 위한 사업입니다. 또한, 우리 중소기업의 활로로서 작용한다고 합니다. 북한 노동력에 대한 의문이 전문가들 사이에서도 많이 나오고 있습니다. 실제로 서호 단장님께서는, 북한의 노동력은 남한의 60% 정도라고 하셨습니다. 생산성이 낮은 이유에 대해서는, 국가 차원의 행사로 인한 잦은 동원과 턱없이 낮은 급여 때문이라고 말씀하셨습니다. 실제로 지급되는 월급이 2~3달러 정도에 불과하며, 숙련공과 초보자의 급여에 거의 차이가 없는 것도 생산성 저하의 원인이라고 설명해 주셨습니다. 현재 개성공단에 들어와 있는 123개의 기업 중, 6~7개의 기업을 제외한 대다수 기업이 유지 상태라고 하는데요, 이것의 근본 이유가 턱없이 낮은 급여에 있지 않나 하는 생각이 들었습니다. 즉, 경제적 제재에 의한 불이익보다 개성공단의 이익이 아직 있기 때문에 유지할 수 있다는 말입니다.

 

<개성공단 1단계 완성을 위하여>

현 123개의 기업과 신청은 하였으나 천안함 이후 리스크 때문에 들어가지 못하고 있는 80여 개의 기업이 있다고 합니다. 서호 단장님께서는 새로운 정부에서 1단계를 내실 있게 마무리하기를 기대하고 있다고 말씀하셨습니다. 그러나 현재의 기업과 새로 들어올 기업 간에는 대립의 여지가 존재합니다. 즉, 현재 있는 123개의 기업은 노동력이 부족하므로 노동력 충원을 요구하고 있는 상황입니다. 한편 새로 들어갈 80여 개의 기업은 노동력의 기본적인 보장을 요구하고 있습니다. 현재 1단계의 38%만 분양이 되어있는 상태이며, 개성 외의 지역에서도 많은 노동력이 들어오고 있다고 합니다. 이관세 교수는, 여성이 약 70%에 달하는 상태에서, 1단계를 내실 있게 마무리 하기 위해서는 단지 노동력 확충뿐만 아니라 탁아소 등 지원시설이 반드시 준비되어야 할 것이라고 지적하셨습니다.

 

<북측 근로자의 변화>

1. 초기에는 남측 인원과 눈 맞춤을 회피하며 인사를 외면하고, 남측 업무지시를 거부했다고 합니다. 즉, 협력사업을 하기 위해 온 것이지 남측의 지시를 받기 위해 온 것이 아니라고 생각했던 것입니다. 그러나 현재는 묵례와 함께 간식을 나누며, 업무나 생산활동에 대해 자연스럽게 대화를 나누게 되었다고 합니다.

 

2. 초기에는 우리 기업을 자본주의에 입각한 착취자로 인식하고, 야간 근무에 대해 노동력 착취 문제 제기를 하였으나, 기업의 생존이 중요하다는 인식으로 바뀌었으며, 자발적인 야간 근무도 시행되고 있다고 합니다.

3. 자신의 급여명세서 등에 대해 무관심했었으나, 현재는 매월 급여명세서에 본인이 확인을 해 나가고 있으며, 현금보다는 현물을 중시하는 경향을 보인다고 합니다.

 

한가지 일화로 개성공단에서는 초코파이를 매일 지급한다고 합니다. 그런데 한국의 계 문화와 같이, 초코파이를 받으면 돌아가면서 한 명에게 몰아준다고 합니다. 그리고 그것을 받은 사람은 시장에 나가서 초코파이를 팔고 이윤을 남기게 되는 겁니다. 그렇게 해서 개성뿐만 아니라 북한 전역에 초코파이가 퍼졌다는 이야기를 해 주셨습니다.

 

3차 핵실험 이후, 국민의 여론은 많이 불안정해 있습니다. 선제타격론이 압도적인 지지를 받는 상황이며, 대화를 모두 차단하고 제재를 가하는 정책에 모두가 주목하고 있습니다. 그러나 압박만을 가한다면 아무것도 해결할 수가 없습니다. 결국, 전쟁이라는 말입니다. 이럴 때일수록 침착하게 바라보아야 합니다. [3차]라는 단어가 말하듯, 북한 핵 문제는 최근의 문제가 아닌 20여 년간 진행 중인 문제인 것입니다. 전쟁은 반드시 막아야 합니다. 문제 해결을 위한 최대한 노력을 다하면서, 회유와 제재를 동시에 진행하는 것이 아직은 최선의 방법이라는 생각이 듭니다. 대한민국 정부는 개성공단을 안정적으로 유지하며, 관리해 나가겠다는 뜻을 견지하고 있습니다. 개성공단에 들어가는 돈이 결국 북한 군부에 흘러가고 그것이 핵무기가 되는 것이 아니냐? 라는 의문이 당연히 들 수 있습니다. 그러나 그럼에도 개성공단은 마지막 보루이기 때문에 반드시 지켜야 하는 것입니다. 그곳은, 정치적인 이념을 뛰어넘은 상생의 장인 것입니다. 분명히 어려운 상황이지만, 하나의 숨통이라도 열어 놓는 것, 그것이 문제 해결의 가능성을 다시금 만들어 낼 것입니다.

 

일본의 북한 제재결의 환영

마이니치 신문(毎日新聞)은 2013년 1월 24일 자 사설에서 북한 미사일 발사에 대한 제재결의를 환영하는 입장을 발표했습니다.

 

북한의 인공위성은 사실상 장거리탄도 미사일이며, 그동안 소극적으로 대응했었던 중국까지 제재에 참여한 점을 높게 평가하고 있습니다. 물론, 중국의 참여가 이제까지의 국제정세를 근본적으로 바꾸는 것은 아니지만, 결의에 반대되는 행동은 하기 어렵기에 의의가 있다고 평가하고 있습니다. 동시에, 주변국들을 군사적 도발로 위협해서는 아무것도 얻을 수 있는 게 없으므로 북한이 자제할 것을 요구했습니다.

 

이번 제재결의의 중요한 점은, 그동안 「의장성명」에 그쳤던 것이, 안보리의 모든 회원국이 제재결의에 동의했다는 점입니다. 이 배경으로는 미국이 적극적인 자세를 지적하고 있습니다. 북한이 미국을 공격하기 위해 미사일을 개발한다고 직접 표명한 이후, 북한은 미국에 있어서 외면할 수 없는 존재가 되어 가고 있는 것입니다. 과거에도, 이러한 협상을 통해 결국은 북한에 유리한 쪽으로 이끌어 간 전례가 있기에, 북한식의 협상을 고수하고 있는 것이라 생각됩니다.

 

북한은 이 제재결의 이후, 외무성 성명에서 장거리 미사일을 더욱 개발하고 쏘아 올리겠다고 선언하였습니다. 미국의 대북정책을 이유로 조선반도의 비핵화는 불가능하다고 까지 단언했습니다. 이 말은, 앞으로의 핵실험을 위한 명목이 될 것입니다. 마이니치 신문에서는, 이제까지와 별 다를 것이 없는 전개가 되리라 전망하고 있습니다만, 필자의 생각은, 더욱 근본적인 대북정책, 특히 북한의 핵 개발에 대한 정책을 새롭게 만들어야 한다고 생각합니다. 북한 입장에서 핵을 포기한다는 것은 생존의 위협에 직결한 것이기에, 그에 대응하는 충분한 안보가 확보되지 않는 한, 핵은 절대 포기하지 않을 것입니다. 그러므로 무조건 먼저 포기하라 하는 것이 아니라, 그 뒤에 안보를 보장하는 평화협정 레벨의 약속을 제시해야 한다고 생각합니다. 마지막으로, 대북정책에 있어서 특히 한미일의 동맹관계는 불가결할 것입니다. 한국과 주변국 지도자들의 현명한 선택을 기대하며, 평화적으로 해결할 수 있는 실마리를 찾아가길 희망합니다.

 

Implications of the North Korean Child Welfare Act of 2012 and Tasks Ahead

A child looks out of a kindergarten in the North Korean city of Hyangsan.

  On January 1, the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives passed a new legislation regarding the protection of “stateless” North Korean children. In the subsequent weeks, the unanimously consented bill, named as the “North Korean Child Welfare Act of 2012,” has taken effect after President Obama signed off on it.

“North Korean Child Welfare Act of 2012,” requires the U.S. Secretary of State to “advocate for the best interests of North Korean children and children of one North Korean parent, including, when possible, facilitating immediate protection for those living outside North Korea through family reunification or, if appropriate and eligible in individual cases, domestic or international adoption.”[1]

In order to avoid provoking the country of concern, China, terms of the bill have been modified and protection measures have been extended to welfare aid. American government will promote family reunification or adoption for North Korean defector children and children of one North Korean parent. Department of State will appoint a representative in charge of briefing the congress on the current conditions, supportive measures, and adoption strategies of children who have defected from North Korea and also North Korean defector women’s children who were born outside of North Korea.

According to the research studies conducted by the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health in 2010[2], the number of defectors has decreased due to tightened border security, while the number of China-born children of North Korean defector women has risen. Some of these children end up becoming “stateless” because extreme poverty and unstable status of their mothers prevent registration of these children as Chinese citizens However, the figures of children without nationality presented by NGOs are somewhat inaccurate because they tend to overlook the complexity of the situation in efforts to promote awareness of the issue.

Legally, a child of North Korean defector woman born in China can acquire Chinese nationality, following his or her father; or North Korean or South Korean nationality, following his or her mother. Obtaining a DPRK nationality is not likely. However, once the mother enters South Korea, the child is protected as a ROK citizen after family relationship registration. Under these circumstances, many China-born children of North Korean defector women have been accompanying their mothers or coming into South Korea after their mother’s arrival. Problems incur when these children are brought into South Korea without the consent of the Chinese father, in which the conflict of parental rights may rise. Since the South Korean government is aware of these practices, China may hold the ROK government accountable for tolerating such practices in the administrative process.

Ratification of the North Korean Child Welfare Act is expected to spread interest in activities related to North Korean defector children and China-born children of North Korean defector women among numerous NGOs, specifically Korean American citizen or North Korean defector groups. During this process, it is highly likely that many Korean-descent Chinese children will pose as children of North Korean defectors in order to become a South Korean citizen, because there is difficulty in distinguishing the two. For the successful implementation of the bill, the U.S. Department of State must continue to work with the Ministry of Unification and researchers who have conducted the studies in China, and ensure that policy discussions are based on objective analysis of the current situation.

---

[1] North Korean Child Welfare Act of 2012, H.R. 1464, 112th Cong. (2012)

[2] Courtland Robinson, “North Korea: Migration Patterns and Prospects” (Center for Refugee and Disaster Response, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University, 2010).

Photo Credit: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/home/books/article-1300950/The-country-birthdays-banned-Its-people-brainwashed-dirt-poor-starving-Now-prize-winning-book-reveals-time-shocking-inside-story-North-Korea-NOTHING-TO-ENVY-BY-BARBARA-DEMICK.html

North Korea: An Interesting Collection, Part I

When talking to my friends about my involvement at MOU and the situation on the Korean peninsula generally, the question “where did you find that?” comes up quite frequently. This series therefore aims at sharing some of the rather unusual and interesting information about North Korea that goes beyond generally streamlined articles that can be found on CNN, BBC or Spiegel. I also hope to provide at least some new insights and links for people who have dealt with North Korea more extensively.

1) The forbidden railway: Vienna – Pyongyang

http://vienna-pyongyang.blogspot.se/

This blog by Helmut Uttenthaler documents how he and his friend Oliver travelled more than 860km by train across North Korea. They were able to freely travel from Tumangan to Pyongyang without government minders, which—to the best of my knowledge—is the only documented time that this has happened. They were therefore able to secure unique footage and also interact with ordinary North Koreans. As such, this blog is extremely interesting because you know that everything you see and read (apart from the official part of the journey took place once they arrive in Pyongyang) has not been altered or modified in any way, shape or form.

 

 

2) Orchestral Maneuvers in the North

http://www.nilsclauss.com/#orchestral

This short film documents the visit of the Munich Chamber Orchestra to Pyongyang. The trip has been organized by the Goethe Institut Korea in order to foster cross-cultural exchange. It is very refreshing to see a documentary about North Korea that is not directly or indirectly aimed at politics but rather highlights how similar people actually are when they share a common interest.

3) Norway to North Korea and North Korea to Norway

http://www.traavik.info/index.php/home.html

Morten Traavik is a Norwegian artist who regularly travels to North Korea and organizes rather unusual cultural exchanges. He famously lent five North Korean music students a CD of Take on Me by A-ha, which they practiced for just two days. During an interview, he later said that these students were among the best he has ever encountered and the video became a YouTube hit with more than 2 million views. Equally important, this cultural exchange is mutual and Morten Traavik has since arranged a trip to Norway for these five students and two North Korean directors, who taught 250 Norwegian border guards to create a similar event to the famous Arirang Mass Games.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rBgMeunuviE

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1oK015laXq4

 

Photo Credit:   

http://www.flickr.com/photos/33180880@N06/3098067683/lightbox/

 

No One Knows What To Expect: Chinese Influence on Unification

A U.S. Senate report published in December, available on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations’s website, advises North Korea watchers not to expect China to support full-fledged democratic unification on the Korean peninsula in the event of regime collapse in North Korea. A Washington Post article explains that China’s aggressive stance toward territory in the South China Sea, including some islands currently administered by Japan, suggests that it will seek to preserve as much influence as it can in North Korea. China has ancient territorial claims to the region.

It’s usually thought that if the Kim regime collapses, South Korea would absorb the North in a political unification similar to West Germany’s absorption of the East. It is increasingly apparent that the Korean case is very different, and China’s opposition would present a major obstacle to unification.

China has made major investments in North Korea’s transportation infrastructure recently, putting billions of dollars into building new roads and ports, as we’ve seen in Rason. China also makes up 70 percent of North Korea’s total trade. Moreover, China has a historical stake in the peninsula, the report argues, as the northern regions of Korea have long been influenced (and sometimes controlled) by Chinese empires.

This map from the Senate report, among others, shows historical Chinese control and influence over parts of the Korean peninsula.

Not all observers agree about China’s intentions, though. In fact, even the leaders in China don’t seem to agree on how China should act. In the Post’s article, Chinese professor Zhang Liangui notes that “one misunderstanding of the U.S. is that they think of China as a whole,” with unified leadership. That’s an oversimplification, and opinions in China are as divided as they are here in the United States.

South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency reported in January that Pan Zhenqiang, a retired general and senior adviser to the Council of China Reform Forum, said, “With regards to the format of unification, China’s formula of ‘one country, two systems’ may have some exemplary value.” This type of unification as a loose federation would enable China to exert more influence on the northern half of the peninsula than it would under a completely Seoul-dominated (and therefore US-influenced) government.

On the other hand, Zhang (who, interestingly, has his degree from Kim Il Sung University in North Korea) believes that China will probably support unification. The Washington Post article gives as his main justification the possibility of “even deeper Chinese investment” in the event of unification.

It is certainly probable that China will fight to win as much influence as is possible on the Korean peninsula, now and also if the regime were to collapse. What will really happen is anyone’s guess. Officials in the United States and South Korea hope for more dialogue on this issue to better prepare for it (though the Kim dynasty seems to be holding on to power just fine right now), but such dialogue is too sensitive for China to be interested in talking about it officially. For now, no one knows what to expect.

여성대통령 탄생, 미래를 주시한 한일관계구축을 위해

이번 기사에서는, 한국의 첫 여성 대통령 탄생과 박근혜 대통령의 대북정책을 바라보는 일본 언론 요미우리신문(読売新聞)의 사설을 소개해 보려고 합니다.　사설의 주제는 대통령 선거 직후인 2012년 12월 21일 「여성대통령탄생 미래를 주시한 한일관계 구축(女性大統領誕生　未来見据えた日韓関係構築を)」입니다.

먼저 동사설에서는, 박근혜 대통령에게 경제의 재건이나, 한일관계 재구축 등에 있어서 지도력을 발휘하여 새로운 시대를 열어줄 것을 기대하고 있습니다.

또한, 박근혜 당선인의 대북관에 대해「남북대화재개의 전향적인 자세는 보이지만, 본격적인 지원은 신뢰관계구축이 전제」라고 한 박 당선인의 입장을 소개했습니다. 북한이 장거리 미사일 발사를 강화하는 것 등, 또다시 핵・미사일개발을 진행하고 있는 것에 대하여 한미일의 연계강화를 중시하고 있는 박근혜 씨의 대통령 당선은 일본에 있어서도 환영할 일이라는 입장을 표명하고 있습니다.

더욱이, 한일관계의 재구축을 다시 한번 요청하며, 국내의 반대에도 한일국교 정상화를 단행하여 한강의 기적을 이룩한 박정희 전 대통령의 이야기도 소개 하고 있습니다.

요미우리 신문은 마지막으로 새로이 선출된 아베(安部)총재의 「긴밀히 의사소통을 한 뒤 대국적인 관점으로 한일관계 관계를 더욱 심화시켜 나갈 것을 희망한다」는 발언을 인용하며, 역사문제가 더 이상 양국의 부정적인 영향을 주지 않기 위해서, 양국의 노력이 필요함을 주장하고 있습니다.

필자의 소견으로는, 역사문제의 해결은 무엇보다도 중요하며 가해국인 일본이 먼저 진실된 사죄를 하는 것이 전제되지 않는 한 한일 양국의 관계 정상화는 언제까지나 불완전할 것으로 생각됩니다. 그렇지만, 일본이 진정한 사죄를 구하는 날, 한국 국민들은 그것을 받아들이고 새로운 평화의 시대를 열어나가야 할 것입니다. 대북정책에 있어서 한미일 3국의 연계는 외교상 반드시 필요한 일입니다. 그러기 위해서는 먼저 관계가 최악으로 달하고 있는 한일관계의 회복이 전제되어야 할 것입니다. 또한, 대북 정책에 있어서 국익만을 생각한다면, 또는, 이상적인 평화만을 생각한다면 완전한 통일은 이루어지지 않을 것입니다. 그러므로 극단으로 기우는 대북정책이 아닌, 원칙을 갖되 유연성 있는 대북정책이 이루어지기를 기원합니다.

Crazy North Koreans, Crazy Americans

I visited the Lincoln Memorial once, and I was moved. Who isn’t? The statue is massive, magisterial, and yet the warmth, empathy, wisdom, and humility of that great man shines even through the cold marble. It’s an impressive monument.

I’m thinking of this because I recently watched “Lincoln”, Steven Spielberg’s newest movie and a recent Oscar contender. Like many viewers, I was amazed by Daniel Day-Lewis’s acting. He showed the president’s confidence, conviction, and humor in the face of adversity. Though it was surely only a poor facsimile of the man himself, that fine portrayal honored a man who may have been our greatest president.

And then I read B. R. Myers’ book The Cleanest Race, which, taking Lincoln as a brief example, clearly shows the fallacy of writing off North Korean people as crazy, of thinking, “even they can’t possibly believe their own propaganda.”

In fact, Myers shows, their belief in their own propaganda is not enigmatic, but very understandable. Look at what I believe about Lincoln: I don’t know the man, and I don’t know much about him beyond the conventional high-school history textbook account. I can quote a few lines of the Gettysburg Address. (I admire Lincoln almost equally for the rhythm and clarity of his prose as for his morality or his politics.) I watched a TED talk about him once (one of my favorite TED talks, actually).

But what do I know of the real Lincoln? All I know was taught to me by history textbooks and college professors, by statues and by movies. How is this different, Myers asks, from North Korean propaganda, which also relies on textbooks, on teachers, on statues, on movies? Are we any different to glorify Lincoln than the North Koreans to venerate the Kim family? Even their myths are quite similar: compare the log cabin in Kentucky where Lincoln was born to the legend of Kim Jong Il’s humble birth in a snowcapped log cabin at the foot of Mt. Baekdu.

In defiance of death, we all seek to find meaning in causes beyond ourselves. That’s part of why I admire Lincoln; he is proclaimed to be one of the greatest leaders of my culture, my country. It’s true that Lincoln played a significant role in the emancipation of black people in America; but I don’t think that’s really what I’m thinking about when we watch the movie. I’m not carefully considering his actual contributions, studying the legislation he championed, or reviewing his philosophy; I’m believing that he represents an ideal of governance largely because that’s how he’s represented to me. In short, I think he’s great because everyone says he is. And so the people bowing at the foot of the 66-foot statue of Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang, the people weeping at the death of their Dear Leader are hardly different from my own feelings of pride and humility at the steps of the Lincoln Memorial.

The Lincoln Memorial on a foggy evening on January 12, 2013. Photo credit Ehpien via Flickr.

Myers does an exceptional job of bringing a further truth home to us: that it is not that surprising that North Koreans are faithful to a dynasty that has materially failed them, even as Americans are faithful to a political and economic system that is manifestly failing us. We just believe what we’re told; if we’re liberals, we blame our economic woes on the war spending, and if we’re conservatives, we blame liberal government spending. It’s a little more complicated than that, but this is how most people think about politics. And North Koreans just blame the Americans, because that’s who the people who ought to know tell them to blame.

How Brian Myers Made Me Rethink The Power of Culture

Brian Myers might have changed my mind. I’ve said in the past that I think cultural influence (i.e. the spread of foreign media) is the most effective way to effect a broad North Korean change in attitude toward other countries. Maybe I’ve believed this because that’s the way it has worked for me: with Korean TV, Japanese literature, Russian literature, as I come into contact with the culture I tend to like the countries that own them more and more.

But maybe Myers is right. He argues in his book The Cleanest Race that cultural influx from South Korea in the form of CDs and DVDs won’t soften North Korean attitudes toward the outside world. He notes that imperial Japan loved Hollywood films, yet still sustained intense animosity toward America. The Nazi Luftwaffe painted images of Mickey Mouse on their planes, yet still sustained intense animosity toward America. Even South Korea, which has become a hotbed of Western cultural influence, was ready to believe in 2002 that a U.S. tank ran over two schoolgirls intentionally (an overview of the case is on Wikipedia), and to believe that the U.S. malignantly imported deadly beef in 2008 (overview available on Wikipedia). So, Myers says, even if every North Korean comes to know and love South Korean dramas and American pop stars, their hostility to our respective governments will remain.

At first I thought, “that’s pretty accurate: shallow cultural experience obviously isn’t enough.” But, said I to myself, there is more that cultural influence can accomplish. Myers himself admits that the true danger for the North Korean government is a matter of awareness. He says,

 

“Most dangerous to the regime… is the inevitable spread of public awareness that for all their anti-Americanism, the South Koreans are happy with their own republic and do not want to live under Pyongyang’s rule.”

 

Most North Koreans, in Myers’ analysis, don’t realize that South Koreans enjoy their standard of living, that they like their government and don’t yearn for Pyongyang rule. Nor do they realize that most South Koreans, sadly enough, feel little urgency about Korea becoming a united nation again. If North Koreans understood this, their whole attitude toward their government would change, since their support is predicated on the assumption that American influence is the only thing standing in the way of national unification, and American military domination the most important threat to North Korean happiness.

Can’t culture accomplish this? It seems that it could show these things in a relatable way.

I suppose I tend to believe in the power of art—for that’s what I think I really mean when I am saying “culture.” I think art has the power to give us a window into the lives of others. There’s a fantastic movie called that: “The Lives of Others.” It’s a German film, and it won the Best Foreign Picture award a few years ago. In it a disciplined, all-business Nazi spy assigned to monitor artistic “subversives” softens; he watches them day in and day out, and comes to understand and even like them.

But thinking about it more, even for this character in the movie, it wasn’t art that changed his mind: it was spying. Long, sustained awareness of what other people are doing and saying even when they think no one is watching. Time spent in the same building as them.

After all, maybe that’s the only thing that will really teach us in the end: time. Hector Berlioz agreed that time is a great teacher. (He also added, “Unfortunately, it kills all its pupils”). But that time takes many hours, months, and even years. Art, no matter how good, just doesn’t give us enough time with a subject. Even real life doesn’t always do the trick: I mean, I’ve spent a year and a half in Korea and I’m not sure how well I understand the people in it.

Anyway, I’ve changed my mind: I think Myers is right, that cultural imports alone won’t be enough to change North Korean people’s minds about the outside world. Coming to any true understanding—for them, for South Koreans, or for Americans—will take a long time.

 

The Interior Life: R. L. Stevenson Writes About North Korea

Surprisingly, an English author who died in 1894 knew a great deal about North Koreans. I was re-reading Robert Louis Stevenson’s little-known essay “The Lantern-Bearers” and it perfectly called to mind the people of North Korea (maybe that’s weird?). I feel like a broken record harping on about how we shouldn’t trust initial impressions of North Korea, but I found this great illustration and I have to share it.

 

Plus it’s such a great essay. More people should know about it.

 

Stevenson writes about his boyhood in Scotland, where in the summers at a seaside village he and the other boys would have a contraption called a bulls-eye lantern. They wore them on their belts and would venture forth after dark with the lanterns carefully concealed under a top-coat. He writes:

 

They smelled noisomely of blistered tin; they never burned aright, though they would always burn our fingers; their use was naught; the pleasure of them merely fanciful; and yet a boy with a bull’s-eye under his top-coat asked for nothing more.

A Dietz “police regular” tin bulls-eye lantern. Photo credit Dutchman Dick via authentic-campaigner.com

Stevenson explains how he would walk through the streets, every now and then encountering another boy. They would each anxiously check to see that the other had his lantern, and once a group of them was collected, would head away from civilization:

 

Four or five would sometimes climb into the belly of a ten-man lugger, with nothing but the thwarts above them—for the cabin was usually locked—or choose out some hollow of the links where the wind might whistle overhead. There the coats would be unbuttoned and the bull’s-eyes discovered; and in the chequering glimmer, under the huge windy hall of the night, and cheered by a rich steam of toasting tinware, these fortunate young gentlemen would crouch together in the cold sand of the links or on the scaly bilges of the fishing-boat, and delight themselves with inappropriate talk.

       But the talk, at any rate, was but a condiment; and these gatherings themselves only accidents in the career of the lantern-bearer. The essence of this bliss was to walk by yourself in the black night; the slide shut, the top-coat buttoned; not a ray escaping, whether to conduct your footsteps or to make your glory public: a mere pillar of darkness in the dark; and all the while, deep down in the privacy of your fool’s heart, to know you had a bull’s-eye at your belt, and to exult and sing over the knowledge.

 

As ordinary as each boy might seem on the outside, walking through the streets at night in an ordinary top-coat, what was inside was completely different.

 

With this as his ammunition, Stevenson takes down the realists:

 

Say that I came on some such business as that of my lantern-bearers on the links; and described the boys as very cold, spat upon by flurries of rain, and drearily surrounded, all of which they were; and their talk as silly and indecent, which it certainly was. I might upon these lines, and had I Zola’s genius, turn out, in a page or so, a gem of literary art, render the lantern-light with the touches of a master, and lay on the indecency with the ungrudging hand of love; and when all was done, what a triumph would my picture be of shallowness and dulness! how it would have missed the point! how it would have belied the boys!…

       For, to repeat, the ground of a man’s joy is often hard to hit. It has so little bond with externals (such as the observer scribbles in his note-book) that it may even touch them not; and the man’s true life, for which he consents to live, lie altogether in the field of fancy…. [T]he poetry runs underground. The observer (poor soul, with his documents!) is all abroad. For to look at the man is but to court deception. We shall see the trunk from which he draws his nourishment; but he himself is above and abroad in the green dome of foliage, hummed through by winds and nested in by nightingales. And the true realism were that of the poets, to climb up after him like a squirrel, and catch some glimpse of the heaven for which he lives.

       And, the true realism, always and everywhere, is that of the poets: to find out where joy resides, and give it a voice far beyond singing.

       For to miss the joy is to miss all…. [to] miss the personal poetry, the enchanted atmosphere, that rainbow work of fancy that clothes what is naked and seems to ennoble what is base; in each, life falls dead like dough, instead of soaring away like a balloon into the colours of the sunset; each is true, each inconceivable; for no man lives in the external truth, among salts and acids, but in the warm, phantasmagoric chamber of his brain, with the painted windows and the storied walls.

 

I think he could be talking about observers of North Korea. If all we imagine when we think of a North Korean kid is a child stunted by malnutrition, coughing from some preventable disease, learning rote propaganda about the Kim dynasty, then we have missed too much. The externals are important, but they don’t tell us anything about the life that is lived inside the mind. If we never imagine the North Korean child with a bulls-eye at his belt, “soaring away like a balloon into the colours of the sunset,” we’re missing the life that is, in most ways, more real than anything else.

 

I’ve only quoted bits and pieces of the original essay (even if it seems like I’ve quoted much more); the whole thing is well worth reading, and you can find it at Gutenberg.org.

 

Book Review: The Cleanest Race

A screenshot of the cover of The Cleanest Race. Image credit Melville House at mhpbooks.com.

 

North Korea has more cultural DNA in common with imperial Japan than with its communist neighbors China and Russia. So says Brian Myers, author of The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why It Matters, and he makes a compelling case. He takes pains to trace a cultural succession that began in 1905, when Japan invaded Korea and began a ruthless colonization and indoctrination of its people. He argues that North Koreans inherited the imperial concept of racial purity (and that Japan meant them to), and that it became the foundation of North Korean self-conception and the basis of their government’s claim to legitimacy.

Essentially, this racial purity means that North Koreans are like children: pure but vulnerable. Hence the need for a protector and a parental figure to guide and lead them against a cruel world bent on domination.

You’ll have to read the book to get more than that from me; suffice to say, it’s an interesting thesis.

I found his arguments cogently written, persuasively explained, and clear. The book was a pleasure to read, actually; he writes very well. Sometimes his evidence felt a little thin; for instance, he claims that Mt. Baekdu didn’t derive any special significance until Japanese veneration of Mt. Fuji came into the picture after 1905, and my research suggested that it’s been of special importance since 1767, if not earlier. Myers also gets a little overenthusiastic about delving into the hyperbole of North Korea’s propaganda assertions; but it’s entertaining, not least for Myers’ sly sense of humor and irony. At 200 pages, it’s a relatively quick read, but an informative and important one, both for general understanding of North Korean ideology and for a more informed approach toward dealing with the country politically.

He claims that traditional American attempts at engagement or buying nuclear concessions with aid or trade are doomed to fail, because the very legitimacy of the North Korean government depends on antagonism toward America. I thought this was one of his strongest points; though it doesn’t tell us what we should do, at least it explains the failure of our traditional (and current) policies.

The Cleanest Race is published by Melville House; you can find it at their website at mhpbooks.com. (Full disclosure: I’m currently working for Melville House, so I do have a somewhat vested interest in believing it to be a great book.)

 

Myanmar and North Korea

In November 2012, President Barack Obama made a historic visit to Myanmar to applaud and support the former military state’s democratization process. Myanmar’s transition to democracy in March 2011 surprised the world—for the previous five decades, it was seen as a pariah state that wielded authoritarian rule, despite harsh economic sanctions and criticism from world leaders.           

Though isolated from the international community, Myanmar had found an ally in North Korea, another obstinate, pariah state. Generally, Myanmar and North Korea have shared a good relationship. Prior to Myanmar’s transition to democracy, the two enjoyed full diplomatic, economic, and military relations. Embassies were established in both countries. As late as 2010, Myanmar was purchasing North Korean military equipment, including small arms, missile components, and nuclear technology. Granted, the Burma-DPRK partnership has hit low points when North Korea killed four Burmese officials during an attempt to assassinate the South Korean President in 1983. But the two have always managed to restore ties through economic and military exchanges.

However, since Myanmar announced its transition to democracy, it has taken measures to end relations with North Korea. After Former President Lee Myung-bak visited Myanmar in May 2012, Myanmar said it would cease its weapons exchange program with Pyongyang. In October 2012, Burmese President Thein Sein publicly announced it was willing to cut Burma-DPRK military ties. In November 2012, Myanmar agreed to sign a nuclear agreement that would allow increased scrutiny by UN nuclear inspectors, effectively ending North Korean shipments of nuclear materials to Myanmar.

Myanmar’s relationship with North Korea has continued to erode at a rapid pace. If Yangon is to sever ties completely with Pyongyang, then North Korea will be even further isolated. This could potentially have large implications for North Korea, economically and morale-wise. Will this encourage Pyongyang to take the same path as its former ally?

Furthermore, Myanmar is evidence that a former military state can open up, contrary to expectations. Though it was a brutal military state that committed atrocious human rights violations for over fifty years, it is now making rapid strides towards democracy. Given their similar pasts as autocratic military regimes, perhaps Myanmar can counsel North Korea on how to open up and establish civilian rule. Hopefully North Korea will follow in Myanmar’s footsteps.

 

Upcoming Challenges for the Two Koreas

            About a year has passed since Kim Jong-un was declared the supreme leader of North Korea. At the moment of Kim Jong-il’s death and the following succession process, experts and scholars expressed mixed feelings about North Korea’s third-generation succession. Many insisted that it was too early to tell the future of North Korea under the new leader. However, after a year of a seemingly stable leadership, some express both a sense of hope and concern for what may follow in the next couple of years. According to JoongAng Ilbo’s news article and research done by the National Assembly Research Service, the North Korean regime may undergo drastic reforms within the next three to four years. This research states that Kim Jong-un will become increasingly pressured to make decisions to accommodate North Korea’s worsening economic system. The report further predicts that Kim Jong-un could face serious internal struggles from the elite group while carrying out major reforms.[1]

The purpose of such research is to inform the incoming government. However, it is difficult to grasp whether or not the incoming government can accommodate each and every prediction. Although President Park Geun-hye has expressed her willingness to meet with Kim Jong-un to achieve “trustpolitik” [2] and increased flexibility, North Korea’s latest rocket launch has already put a further strain on inter-Korean relations. While South Korea would welcome major economic reforms as predicted in the research, the current situation demonstrates how extremely difficult it is to coordinate policies towards a nuclear North Korea. While I sincerely hope that Park’s ambitious goals regarding inter-Korean relations are manageable, the incoming government will be left with very similar problems from the Lee administration that it will need to address, including Beijing-Pyongyang relations, denuclearization of North Korea, and strengthening inter-Korean economic relations.

Park Geun-hye meeting with visiting Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun

Source <http://koreajoongangdaily.joinsmsn.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=2965344&gt;

            It is too early to predict the future of North Korea or inter-Korean relations regarding that matter. However, it is possible that Park administration may have caught North Korea at the verge of major transformation. Whether or not such transformation brings the two Koreas closer to unification is unclear and impossible to predict, but I hope that the incoming government continues to actively engage its citizens in preparation for unification.

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[1] Full article available at <http://koreajoongangdaily.joinsmsn.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=2965755&gt;

[2] Read more about it at: Park Geun-hye. (2011). “A new kind of korea: Building trust between seoul and pyongyang.” Foreign Affairs, 90(5), 13-18.

 

How We Should Study the North

It has been argued that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) still remains the terra incognita of many academic fields. While there have been substantial contributions to North Korean studies over the past decade, our understanding of the DPRK remains plagued with misconceptions and false assumptions. Mass media continues to project an image of the North clouded by stereotypes and hysteria, making it difficult to study from a point of view other than that of an outsider. Yet, it is no longer the case that lack of information or interest that renders the study of North Korea challenging. Borrowing the words of Charles Armstrong, if seen as a “foreign policy ‘problem’, [the North] will not be taken seriously as a subject of research” (2011). With the recent surge of scholarly work on North Korea, many publications provide more reliable claims based not on the ‘know thy enemy’ disposition, but on evidence and rigorous research.

            No matter how systematic and sound the research methodologies can be, one’s work will always have to bear the limitations due to the endless amount of concerns with regards to the reliability of statistics on North Korea. At first glance, the concerns on reliability are grave enough to discourage one from conducting research on North Korea. Therefore, any statistical figure on the North cannot be taken at face value but must be collected in a time-series format to allow observation of trends over time periods of interest.

There are infinite variables that can possibly affect a state’s economy and the North’s case is certainly not an exception. Moreover, what makes the DPRK most unpredictable for North Korea watchers is its reliance on a policy of strategic deception, or maskirovka in former Soviet terminology.[1] Over the past decades of the Republic’s history, its economic policies have swung like a pendulum between inch-by-inch decentralization and recentralization. However, as I have discussed already in my previous writing, the most obvious and consistent feature of the DPRK is that it has never experienced a change in the government. Furthermore, once the oscillations are contextualized on a political historical timeline, it becomes very noticeable that little to none of the political basis on the North’s economy has been modified. Never has the North shown signs of weakening the emphases on self-sufficiency (jaryukgaengseng) and the national ideology of Juche.

In the context of the fact that two Koreas are still technically at war, efforts must continue to be taken in order to deter the further hostilities from the North, thus preventing an escalation. Nevertheless, if perceived as a ‘surreal enemy’, one’s research on the North would fail to provide insights into the North’s internal rationale that drives its policy decisions. Such an approach does not provide us a solution, but a list of the reasons why the North’s internal and external status-quo is not sustainable.

Sooner or later, the North will have to make adjustments to its political and economic policies. As a matter of fact, a reform through a collapse of the Kim regime is certainly a possible scenario. However, regardless of whether the DPRK’s reform will be classified as ‘Chinese-style’ or ‘Vietnamese-Style,’ or even ‘DPRK-style,’ a successful transformation into to a functioning economy and a responsible member of a global society is virtually impossible without some degree of the regime’s decentralization, and self-drive by the North. It is equally as important to investigate what kind of political dynamics other states need to construct before they can actively engage with Pyongyang, without being deceived by the North’s maskirovka.

References

Armstrong, C. (2011). Trends in the Study of North Korea. The Journal of Asian Studies,70(02), 357-371. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0021911811000027

Marumoto, M. (2009, March). Project Report: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Economic Statistics Project (April-December 2008). Retrieved December 19, 2012, from http://uskoreainstitute.org/research/special-reports/dprk-economic-statistics-report/

Merril, J. (1989). Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War. Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press.

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[1] There are many examples of such actions, dating back to June 1950 when the North offered Seoul a new peace and unification initiative just a week before the surprise attack (Merrill 1989, 176). A more recent and notorious example is the fabricated data the North submitted to the IAEA about the status of its nuclear development program.

Richardson and Schmidt goes to North Korea

 

Former New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson and Google’s Chairman Eric Schmidt have made a controversial trip to one of the most isolated places in the world – North Korea – to send 3 powerful messages. Despite what the State Department has called “ill-advised” and “unhealthy” idea due to the tension U.S. has with North Korea after the recent rocket launch, Fmr. Gov. Richardson holds his view very strongly and stated that it is very crucial to engage with North Korea and that they have been very successful in doing so.

 

So what kinds of messages were delivered in North Korea by the two high-profile, private citizens? Schmidt states that the first message was to “urge the North Koreans to have a moratorium on missile activity and nuclear tests. Secondly, to find out about the American detained there, Kenneth Bay, and ensure that he be properly treated, and then thirdly, to spread the message about an open society, the Internet and cell phones.” Although they didn’t get a chance to meet North Korea’s dictator, Kim Jung-Un, Richardson said he seems to be much more open to the idea of Internet, and spreading the information to the People of North Korea rather than keeping it just as a part of the government. His assumption is backed up by seeing Kim Jung-Un getting more involved with the People of North Korea and making more public speeches, unlike his father.

 

As Richardson describes, the trip was labeled as a “private humanitarian mission” and it was assumed that they would try hard to negotiate the release of a South Korean born American citizen, Kenneth Bae who was held hostage since November 2012. But the effort had not been successful.

 

I would say it is still very questionable as to how established Kim Jung-Un feels about his domestic strength with his people is and whether he is ready to engage in diplomacy. I don’t doubt Richardson’s statement about how Schmidt was a “rock star” among the North Korean students, scientists and software engineers when he was emphasizing about the importance of the Internet; however, it is not necessarily the People whom we have issues with. It’s difficult, if not impossible, for the outsiders to get the message to the People of North Korea because the government is very strict with its censorship. Many countries, especially South Korea has shown tremendous effort in engaging and negotiating with North Korea in the past decade with the Sunshine Policy. Rather than heading towards confrontation, many countries have reached out to have dialogues and diplomacy, but it was mostly the government of North Korea closing itself up to others rather than opening up. Although Richardson states that Kim Jung-Un has taken various economic measures to show that he is willing to reform, I think it is too early to assume anything and we lack evidence to make such an assumption.

 

 

North Korea’s Environmental Persona (Or Anima?)

A typical North Korean town is visible in the distance in Sinwon county, South Hwanghae province, DPRK. Image credit Frühtau via Flickr.

 

Robert Winstanley-Chesters is a graduate student in the School of Geography at the University of Leeds. You would think a British geographer would have little to do with the Korean peninsula, but Winstanley-Chesters has an uncommon geographic focus: North Korea. Recent articles he has written have titles like “Forests as Spaces of Revolution and Resistance: Thoughts on Arboreal Comradeship on a Divided Peninsula” and “‘Landscape as Political Project?’ – Pragmatic and Reflexive Policy Development in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Revealing a Multifunctional Approach to Forestry Strategy”. With titles like those, who could resist?

I came across his name in the program for Central European University’s early September conference on “Whither the Two Koreas?” in Budapest. Beyond impressing me with the bold use of the word “whither”, the conference has introduced me to several scholars on Korean affairs, and Winstanley-Chesters is one of the more interesting.

Further investigation on his profile at the University of Leeds reveals extensive writings about environmental themes in North Korea; you can read many of them on SinoNK.com, where he is a frequent contributor.

One of his articles from March 2012 deals with the death of Kim Jong Il the previous December. At the time, the state news reported that nature itself appeared to mourn the Dear Leader’s passing:

“Bears live in deep forest and sleeps in a burrow in winter. That day, however, the bears appeared on the road in the daytime, on which Kim Jong Il took his way, and roared for a long time. It was really mysterious…even beasts seemed to cry with sorrow for the demise of the heaven-born great man…” (Rodong Sinmun,2011)

It wasn’t only bears that day; Manchurian cranes adopted postures of grief and magpies mourned in massive flocks, while ice cracked thunderously in the caldera lake of Mount Baekdu. The state news reportage of these events, claims Winstanley-Chesters, is one small part of the DPRK’s attempt to engage the natural environment in the legitimization of the regime.

This bit of news about the environment is only one part of the picture. North Korea also uses environmental criticisms to denounce countries like the U.S. and Japan, implying its own virtue and legitimacy by comparison. The DPRK participates in regional environmental forums such as the Greater Tumen Initiative and the North East Asia Forest Forum; it is in the process of constructing massive hydroelectric dams, and even sells carbon credits to developed countries. In these ways and others, North Korea is paying a lot of attention to its environment, and I think that’s a good thing.

So, the KCNA may be wrong to use nature to justify the current political regime dynasty, as Winstanley-Chesters argues it is doing. But I’m more interested in what North Korean people might be thinking than what the regime is thinking.

I’m writing this article on my back deck. It’s a quiet day on our street, so there isn’t much noise from cars. The neighbor’s cats prowl through every now and again on missions of their own devising; birds rustle in the leaves behind the shed, and a bee just flew past and settled on the ashes of the fire pit, crawling over cinders. The sunlight has a peculiar strength through the bare branches of the trees, a quality it seems to have mostly in early morning or late afternoon when the angle of the sun is low and acorns or leaves on the ground cast sharp shadows. I’ve noticed that the more time I spend outdoors, the more I get an odd sense that there is life, agency, purpose, and connection between even inanimate things. The caps of acorns seem to hold a profound significance I can’t quite explain.

Most of the time, of course, I am still doing what most Americans do: I’m living in a big city; I’m looking at screens for far too many hours of the day; I’m getting around by car. Nature is effectively excluded from the routine of my life. So whatever it is I am experiencing about nature, I’m sure it’s nothing compared to what the average North Korean in the countryside knows and feels. Citizens of Pyongyang aside, most North Koreans get by with little electricity, little auto transport, and few electronic devices. With no screens or traffic to distract, they seem likely to be very connected to the natural environment; if I find meaning in the caps of acorns, it might not seem very ridiculous to North Koreans to suppose that a Manchurian crane’s posture or the cracking of ice on a lake are related to the death of their leader; they might see the whole country as bound up in one great purpose.

This is what Winstanley-Chesters glimpses; he, however, sees the pronouncements as evidence of a conscious, intentional narrative strategy on the part of the KCNA. Perhaps it is, but I think it might also be a more earnest or unconscious part of their national psyche.

Who Is North Korea’s KCNA News Aimed At?

 

A screenshot of the website of the Korean Central News Agency. Image via http://www.kcna.kp.

 Picture yourself on the shores of the Chesapeake Bay, where the food of summer is blue crab. When you eat crabs, someone dumps a couple dozen of the bright red spidery crustaceans coated in Old Bay seasoning in the middle of a table clothed in heavy brown paper, and you go to work with hammer and sharp knife to extract the meat. You have to work for your food, but that’s why people like it.

But you never see people eating crabs alone. It’s just too much work for too little reward. If you’ve got a group of friends, you sit around drinking beer and eating crabs, and the time you spend laboring over tiny pieces of meat is worth it because you’ve got company. But if you’re on your own, you probably just order a crab cake sandwich, skip the hard work, and enjoy the fruits of the labors of others.

Learning about Korean affairs can be kind of like eating crabs. No one wants to read professional journals of political affairs to find out what’s going on in North Korea, unless they are making a party out of it with a bunch of friends. Maybe they should—the content is often fresh, well researched, and carefully thought out, everything that conventional media coverage is not. But the sweet delicious meat of scholarly papers is usually wrapped in a hard, spiky, forbidding shell of field-specific jargon and seasoned with a convoluted grammar that burns worse than Old Bay seasoning. It takes too much time and effort to crack that shell, and few people are willing to go it alone. So most people read the news, which is easily digestible, even though most news doesn’t have that much meat to it.

So let’s spend some time together eating crabs. We will be dinner companions, you and I.

Our first crab is named Jana Hajzlerova. She is a professor in the Czech republic, and in a recent interview with NK News she describes interesting conclusions from her research on thematic agenda and narrative structure in the KCNA news.

Essentially, she’s researching the stories that North Korea is telling its citizens and the world, and trying to figure out why are they telling them. The small stream of stories coming out of North Korea is dominated by the KCNA, which is the leadership’s central news desk. Since it’s the party’s main voice, it’s worth analyzing.

She argues that this voice is not, as is commonly believed, speaking mostly to foreign audiences. Instead, the stories are directed mostly at North Koreans themselves.

Why?

First, more than half of the current news was taken up with reporting on world conflicts, most of which had no direct connection to North Korea. Beyond showing that the reporters are less information-isolated than we often imagine, this is also puzzling. Why spend the news reporting on a conflict in the distant Middle East? Such reporting usually involves North Korea taking sides against the U.S.; Hajzlerova says it is effectively telling North Korean citizens, “we’re not alone in this, the U.S. attacks just about every country it wants to, and so we have to resist.” This gives legitimacy to the North Korean government’s military-first policies.

Second, KCNA news is usually somewhat dated by modern standards. One North Korean has said (in the wonderful “Ask a North Korean” feature on NKNews.org) that she was surprised to find out that the South Korean news reports on events in real time. Dated news is only helpful for people with no other alternative—so that means it must be targeted at North Korean audiences.

Third, the KCNA was consistently and aggressively negative about the former South Korean president Lee Myung Bak—(making reference to him rather than the current President Park Geun Hye since she has only started her term very recently). This isn’t surprising, but what perhaps is surprising is that in their stories, the South Korean people are victims under Lee Myung Bak’s evil reign. This could be aimed at South Koreans, but most likely it is intended to further North Korea’s claim of legitimate rule over the entire peninsula. If Lee Myung Bak is ruling unfairly and illegitimately, it just makes sense that North Korea would be justified in deposing him, to save the poor South Korean citizens. This image legitimizes the North Korean government’s would-be role as savior and liberator of the Korean people.

Hajzlerova’s perceptive interviewer points out that this exactly mirrors how Western media portray North Korea: the people are mostly victims living under an evil villain’s tyrannical rule.

Perhaps we should consider our own media’s narratives more carefully. We know the KCNA is wrong that South Koreans want North Korea to sweep in and free them from their democratic society led by their evil president; perhaps it is presumptuous of us to imagine that all North Koreans are praying for deliverance from the evil rule of Kim Jong Un, and especially presumptuous to imagine that we, not the North Korea people, are the right ones to deliver them from that evil.

 

The Gateway Drug Of Intercultural Exchange: Korean Drama

 

NKNews.org has a new feature called “Ask a North Korean”; Kim Jae Young, who recently escaped from the DPRK and now lives in South Korea, is the correspondent. Every week, a reader’s question is chosen and Kim answers it with a short essay about life in North Korea.

It’s just one person’s perspective, but it’s an amazing resource. Details from a person’s life and simple stories do so much more to teach us about a foreign place than do news reports about the latest rocket launch. She covers diverse topics, including typical holidays, romantic relationships, how propaganda is experienced, South Korea’s confusing coffee culture, and North Korean perceptions of South Korea.

A screenshot from the Ask A North Korean feature at NK News. Image via nknews.org.

 

I want to talk about her first post, which answers the question: “What do North Koreans really think about South Koreans?” Kim says that it really depends on where you are in North Korea; citizens who live near the borders with China, for instance, “know a lot about South Korea.” She goes on to explain that most of this is from foreign media smuggled across the border (a topic covered in a previous OneKorea series). But far from the border—that is, for most of North Korea—foreign media has made much slower inroads, so most North Koreans probably know less about South Korea than is indicated by the reports of defectors, who comprise so much of what we know about the country and are mostly from the border regions.

Kim was in high school before she had any non-state-mediated exposure to South Korea, and—like many people all over the world—that first exposure was through a Korean drama. Korean dramas have become popular internationally (want to see one? Hulu.com has a whole category dedicated to Korean dramas), and they’re a big part of North Korean foreign media exposure to their southern neighbor. Kim’s first Kdrama, “Stairway to Heaven”, opened her eyes to the differences in material welfare between North and South Korea, and forged an emotional connection as the death of the drama’s heroine sent her into a three-day depression.

 

 A promotional image for the Korean drama “Stairway to Heaven.” Image credit kpopgayo.com.

 

It was a gateway drug; after the Kdrama, Kim soon began searching out Korean radio channels. She would alter the family radio by means of a matchstick, so she could listen to the foreign broadcasts, tuned “not louder than the whisper of an ant.” Soon she realized that her state-fed perceptions of South Korea were often wrong, and this seems like it must have been a major factor in her eventual decision to go to South Korea.

Her story proves the power of cultural exchange. Governments are wise to pour money into programs that inform, like Radio Free Asia: that’s what would-be defectors turn to eventually. But programs that entertain are often most powerful at offering an initial point of access to something we know little about. It’s a critical link in the acquisition of information—it gets us interested. If we want more North Koreans to understand foreign nations, they need more access to our culture’s entertainment.

And if we want more Westerners to understand North Korea better, we need more entertaining points of access for more people. That’s why movies like “Comrade Kim Goes Flying”, or books like The Orphan Master’s Son, are so important. Still, they don’t substitute for media actually produced in North Korea.

So, go read the stories at Ask a North Korean. Be informed and entertained. If you find something you like, share it with people you know—you are a critical link to a greater understanding of North Korea.

“Bol” Movie Review: The Power of Words

“Bol Nay Ke Liye Ijazat Nahi Himmat Chahiye”

It takes not consent, but courage to speak up.

 

Despite its probing of human rights conditions in Pakistan, Shoaib Mansoor’s “Bol” was selected as a contender at the Pyongyang International Film Festival (PIFF) 2012. Source: “Bol” Official Website

I categorically avoid South Asian movies, quality withstanding. Bollywood, Tollywood, Lollywood, you name it. Averaging about three hours in length, these films leave me more exhausted than ever, hence my disinclination to watch “Bol,” the Urdu feature film that made rounds in multiple film circuits. “Bol” made one of its recent stops at Pyongyang International Film Festival (PIFF), where it won the Award for Best Photography, from the slim pick of sixteen contending features ^[1].

“Bol,” director Shoaib Mansoor’s sophomore venture is nothing if not bold, and is one of the newer crops of Pakistani releases that serve as a nod to the various socio-economic problems, mostly rooted in the Shariah, that has plagued Pakistan since its inception. “Bol” alludes to the many facets of the misogynistic mindset harbored by South Asian men in general —the pervasiveness of spousal abuse, female infanticide, discrimination against the “third sex,” ethnic and religious minorities— in effect, becoming a microcosm of the societal evils in Pakistan. Including all of these themes seemed absolutely ludicrous and a tad bit ambitious as well. I failed to imagine why the Pakistani government selected “Bol” to be screened at any international film festival. Cinematography aside, it manifested everything that is dark about the Pakistani society. More than anything, I found the choice of “Bol” amongst the other films screened at PIFF absolutely astounding. It would seem ironic that a nation slammed with allegations of human rights violations would be reluctant to disclose the violations of another on the silver screen.

For me, “Bol” is the poignant tale of a woman’s bitter fight against the privileged male-dominated society. It wasn’t your everyday South Asian musical, despite starring Atif Aslam, arguably one of the most famous pop acts in South Asia.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e_DxgZU5yoI[U1]

Set in Lahore, “Bol” is the story of Zainab, a woman on the verge of execution. As the oldest sister of the six, she confronts the brunt of her father’s frustrations regarding his wife’s multiples miscarriages, delivery of stillborn children, and “inability” to conceive a male heir to bear the family line, as well as the finances. The male child eludes him as Zainab’s mother births a hijra[i], much to his displeasure. The film follows Hakim, Zainab’s religious father, who struggles to maintain his integrity amidst financial instability, his qualms about the existence of his effeminate sire Saifee, and his desire to have a son. He eventually murders Saifee, gives birth to a daughter with a courtesan, and a series of events unravel that culminates with his death at the hands of Zainab. The film ends with Zainab asking the audience, “Why is only killing a sin? Why isn’t giving birth one?”

The film has its flaws. The arguments between Zainab and Hakim concerning the Holy Quran become repetitive, and some issues are never discussed. Technical glitches aside, the film never provides the back-story of Zainab’s divorce, furthers the life vs. choice debate, or explores the responsibility of parents to assume their children’s existence. Then again, the reality of some prevalent human rights issues makes up for the mangled storyline consisting of women’s emancipation, trans-sexualism, right to education and religiosity—none of which are ever fully addressed. The film never begs for sympathy, but does not lose its heart in the process. It remains sincere in its demands for equal treatment of all human beings. It makes us question a society where killing is a crime, but giving birth, without the intent to provide the child a dignified life, is not.

Humaima Malick, the actress playing Zainab, becomes the instrument for female emancipation with poise and élan. She is the only one who refuses to acquiesce to her father’s demands, and the male-dominated society by extension. She dares to speak, and make us think. She makes us attach ourselves to the lives of her sisters who were denied proper education by their “religious” father, and those sisters who fell victims to infanticide. In making us consider these issues, she establishes that with sufficient resolve, one can bring the heaviest of issues to the fore, as expressed by the film’s tagline.

What makes this film powerful and relatable is the universality of the problems it sheds light on, as well as the need to address them. Replace the Pakistani father with an Indian one, and infanticide would still persist. Such issues are seemingly prevalent in North Korea, which had previously been accused of denying reproductive rights to the disabled and those with genetic mutation, alongside killing disabled newborns as well ^[2].

While screening a film like “Bol” may not be indicative of a better human rights regime as one may argue, it could still be considered as coming to terms with rampant human rights issues. Granted, that might be an over-projection of thoughts, but the endeavor to screen a film as unique as “Bol” demonstrates a willingness of the DPRK to open up and “cross cultural boundaries,” as my fellow correspondent Jay McNair aptly stated ^[3]. The recognition of human rights concerns in “Bol” brought people together in the divisive world of politics in South Asia, akin to what the screening of “Comrade Kim Goes Flying” at the Pusan International Film Festival may have achieved for the two Koreas.

It may be too soon to say whether such measures will be pivotal to unification. On the surface, “Bol” has introduced its North Korean audience to a new language, a new culture, and a new perspective on life. Therein lies the beauty of the common language of films, one that is blind to cultural and political differences. And, we are drawn closer to each other because of it.

“Bol” premiered on June 24, 2011 in theatres across Pakistan and stars Humaima Malik, Atif Aslam, Mahira Khan, Iman Ali, Shafqat Cheema, Manzar Sehbai, Zaib Rehman and Am

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[i] A South Asian terminology for those with irregular male genitalia, traditionally translated into English as “eunuch” or “hermaphrodite.”Hijras are typically born with male physiology, with only a few having been born with male intersex variations. In the context of this movie, “Hijra” may be interpreted as a homosexual in the process of becoming transsexual. For further  information, please use the following link: http://androgyne.0catch.com/hijrax.htm